# CVE-2026-99672: can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock

Status: published. Published: 2026-11-20. Updated: 2026-11-22.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock

The receive lists of a CAN device are located in the device's
can_ml_priv and travel with the device when it is moved to another
network namespace. But they are protected by the per-netns
rcvlists_lock. So can_rx_unregister() needs dev_net(dev) to pick the
right lock and silently returns when the passed namespace does not
match dev_net(dev) anymore.

isotp_release() and bcm_release() leave their notifier list before they
take any lock that serializes against the netdev notifier, which runs
under RTNL. When the bound device is moved to another namespace in this
window, the notifier skips the socket and the release path has to remove
the filters itself. isotp_release() passes the socket's namespace, which
does not match dev_net(dev) anymore. bcm_rx_unreg() passes dev_net(dev),
which can_rx_unregister() reads again for its check, so a namespace
change between both reads makes the check fail as well. In both cases
can_rx_unregister() silently returns. As can_rx_register() stores
rcv->sk without a reference, the remaining receivers point to the freed
socket (isotp) or the freed op (bcm):

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in isotp_rcv+0x1570/0x24d0
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff888118130552 by task isotp_ns_uaf/578
   can_rcv_filter+0x4af/0x8c0
   can_receive+0x28d/0x3c0
   can_rcv+0x2a9/0x310
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x21a/0x260
   process_backlog+0x210/0x760

Besides this, the lists of a device are protected by the rcvlists_lock
of the namespace that is passed in. Callers which pass dev_net(dev) read
it at different times, so the same lists may be modified under the locks
of different namespaces while the device is moved.

Taking RTNL in these release paths is no option: raw_bind(),
raw_setsockopt() and raw_release() already hold RTNL while adding and
removing up to CAN_RAW_FILTER_MAX filters per socket, which unprivileged
users can trigger repeatedly and which makes RTNL a global bottleneck.

Instead fix the root cause and add a spinlock to struct
can_dev_rcv_lists, which protects the receive lists of a CAN device or
the 'any' CAN device lists of a namespace. It is initialized in
can_set_ml_priv(), which is used by all CAN network devices. With this,
can_rx_unregister() finds the subscription independently of the
current namespace of the device. The protocols keep the device valid
with their tracked references. The per-netns rcvlists_lock only protects
the receive list statistics anymore, and CAN_RAW, CAN_BCM and CAN_ISOTP
pass the namespace that has been used for can_rx_register().

So isotp_release() and bcm_release() now remove their filters correctly
without RTNL, and raw_release(), raw_setsockopt(), raw_bind() and
isotp_bind() do not need RTNL anymore and add and remove their filters
under lock_sock(). To serialize bind() with NETDEV_UNREGISTER, bind()
publishes the device inside the RCU section of its lookup, and
raw_notify() and isotp_notify() recheck the bound device under lock_sock().
As RTNL does not keep NETDEV_DOWN out of bind() anymore, bind() checks
IFF_UP after publishing the bound device, with a barrier pair against
raw_notify() and isotp_notify(), so a down transition during bind() is
still reported with ENETDOWN.

## Remediation

No remediation reported in collected sources

## Affected products and versions

- Linux / Linux: ≥ 8e8cda6d737d356054c9eeef642aec0e8ae7e6bc; < 59d91f555ada337458c48316987b8ef46487f885 (affected, git); ≥ 8e8cda6d737d356054c9eeef642aec0e8ae7e6bc; < 4b625dde57c0a40a933bf017ff93a64a7306aa43 (affected, git); ≥ 8e8cda6d737d356054c9eeef642aec0e8ae7e6bc; < 228e795ec650c33ebbce8ba81ce983c84d64d889 (affected, git); ≥ 8e8cda6d737d356054c9eeef642aec0e8ae7e6bc; < 0f3ad9ab40e3dad06d5c0693806e07935ceedbc3 (affected, git). Source: CNA: Linux
- Linux / Linux: 4.12 (affected); ≥ 0; < 4.12 (unaffected, semver); ≥ 6.12.118; ≤ 6.12.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 6.18.64; ≤ 6.18.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.3.5; ≤ 7.3.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.4-rc2; ≤ * (unaffected, original_commit_for_fix). Source: CNA: Linux

## Severity and prioritization

- CVSS 3.1: 7.8 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; source: CNA: Linux

- CVSS 3.1: 7.8 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; source: NVD: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

- CISA KEV: No listing in collected sources

- EPSS: 0.17% as of 2026-11-21; percentile 6.19%

- SSVC: Not available

- Weaknesses: Not reported

## Exploit evidence

No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59d91f555ada337458c48316987b8ef46487f885 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b625dde57c0a40a933bf017ff93a64a7306aa43 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/228e795ec650c33ebbce8ba81ce983c84d64d889 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f3ad9ab40e3dad06d5c0693806e07935ceedbc3 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f3ad9ab40e3dad06d5c0693806e07935ceedbc3 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/228e795ec650c33ebbce8ba81ce983c84d64d889 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b625dde57c0a40a933bf017ff93a64a7306aa43 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59d91f555ada337458c48316987b8ef46487f885 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

## Provenance

- CNA: Linux: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99672; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99672; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- FIRST EPSS: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99672; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated Not reported

Revision: 5f61bf9ed122e7d37e2d4a91b534381a8b462d9e45bf60c5ea6d0229b094b066

Canonical: https://y2.dev/cve/CVE-2026-99672

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