# CVE-2026-99650: mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in

Status: published. Published: 2026-11-20. Updated: 2026-11-22.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in

A folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the
swap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma
can then be freed, so ksm_might_need_to_copy() must not dereference it
to compare roots.

Doing so can result in some false-positives, resulting in the reverse
mapping missing the new folio mapping, preventing migration and reclaim.

SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allows individual anon_vma objects to be reused
immediately after freeing. A stale pointer can then refer to another
anon_vma whose root matches, even though the target VMA is not linked
to that anon_vma.

Move the anonymous rmap compatibility checks into
folio_anon_rmap_compatible(). Keep the page-index check and compare the
folio's anon_vma pointer against the VMA's own anon_vma and root first.

If neither matches, bite the bullet and walk the VMA's anon_vma_chain.
The VMA keeps these anon_vmas alive, and finding a match guarantees that
reverse mapping can find the new mapping.

Lorenzo Stoakes says in a private discussion:

  "This isn't quite equivalent to the existing check.

  Every anon_vma in an anon_vma_chain shares the same root, but if you
  split a VMA then fork both of them like this:

                  VMA A
               /        \         <split>
            VMA B      VMA C
               \        /
        root <- anon_vma 1
               ----^ ^----        <fork>
              /   parent  \
        anon_vma 2   anon_vma 3
             |            |
           VMA D        VMA E

  VMA's D and E both get their own new
  anon_vma's such that:

  VMA D: anon_vma 2 -> anon_vma 1 -> root
  VMA E: anon_vma 3 -> anon_vma 1 -> root

  And if you found a folio referencing anon_vma 2, the existing check:

	anon_vma->root == vma->anon-vma->root

  Would be true for VMA's B, C, D & E.

  However after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only
  one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain.

  Whether or not that could actually happen in practice... 🙂 I don't
  know.

  [...] after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only
  one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. [...] I would [...] say that
  you are making the test stricter but more correct.
"

If this affects performance when KSM was never even involved, we could
just track whether KSM ever merged anything and just skip these checks.

There isn't really a lot we can do otherwise: for mapped folios we might
be able to use folio_get_anon_vma(), but for unmapped folios there really
is no easy way to see if the anon_vma is still valid.

Document the (confusing) lifetime requirements of folio_anon_vma().

## Remediation

No remediation reported in collected sources

## Affected products and versions

- Linux / Linux: ≥ ba6f0ff3981e6263ab81ac512f04cca55b85ec81; < 85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a (affected, git); ≥ ba6f0ff3981e6263ab81ac512f04cca55b85ec81; < 4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e (affected, git). Source: CNA: Linux
- Linux / Linux: 2.6.36 (affected); ≥ 0; < 2.6.36 (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.3.5; ≤ 7.3.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.4-rc2; ≤ * (unaffected, original_commit_for_fix). Source: CNA: Linux

## Severity and prioritization

- CVSS 3.1: 7.8 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; source: CNA: Linux

- CVSS 3.1: 7.8 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; source: NVD: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

- CISA KEV: No listing in collected sources

- EPSS: 0.16% as of 2026-11-21; percentile 4.73%

- SSVC: Not available

- Weaknesses: Not reported

## Exploit evidence

No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

## Provenance

- CNA: Linux: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99650; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99650; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- FIRST EPSS: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99650; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated Not reported

Revision: ece75a7722c85806094de4febb72b4f5637ca1aab2da1ec9c23f91f6d194c359

Canonical: https://y2.dev/cve/CVE-2026-99650

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