CVE-2026-99586
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Handle ARM erratum for CONT under invalidation with SVA
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Handle ARM erratum for CONT under invalidation with SVA The erratum (MMU-700: #3777127, S3: #3673557) deals with under invalidation of a CONT PTE grouping in the SMMU. The recommended work around is to use a range invalidation that spans the entire CONT. The only user of CONT in the kernel right now is through SVA sharing a CPU page table that contains a CONT created by the mm. Previously it was thought that this errata was dealt with because the driver always uses range invalidation. However, there is a subtle detail in the errata that the invalidation range must fully enclose the entire CONT for it to work. It seems that two sequential range invalidations, with a split point falling inside a CONT grouping, will not prevent the errata. The SMMU's range invalidation generation algorithm does not produce a single invalidation for a single SVA invalidation request, nor does the mm carefully align the SVA invalidation ranges to accommodate the splitting of the invalidation into several ranges. Thus, when processing a SVA invalidation, the range invalidation splitting routine can generate a range invalidation that is split in the middle of the CONT and risk under invalidation from this errata. This condition could be triggered by a malicious userspace manipulating the TLB gathers via mmap/mprotect/munmap. Update the errata list to the include the S3 variation, detect the IOMMUs that have it, and then have SVA invalidations use a simplified version of the over invalidation algorithm from the tlbi rework series. This ensures that a single range invalidation is issued for a single MMU notifier callback and now the range invalidation is guarenteed to cover any posible CONT. Future work to add CONT to iommu_domain page tables should either use this one-invalidate/one-range invalidation algorithm or disable CONT support in the iommu_domain.
Fixes and workarounds
No remediation reported in collected sources.
Missing remediation information is not evidence that no patch exists.
Affected products and versions
| Product | Versions | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
≥ 3f1ce8e85ee06dbe6a8b2e037e9b35f6b32e9ab3; < 96ecddc5141c967c5a59fa85ccbdfdb3cec61209 (affected, git) ≥ 3f1ce8e85ee06dbe6a8b2e037e9b35f6b32e9ab3; < 84c6089a365ff5547f9ea30cb407dc5fe3124fd3 (affected, git) Other versions: unaffected |
CNA: Linux |
| Linux Linux |
5.10 (affected) ≥ 0; < 5.10 (unaffected, semver) ≥ 7.3.5; ≤ 7.3.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 7.4-rc1; ≤ * (unaffected, original_commit_for_fix) Other versions: affected |
CNA: Linux |
Version ranges are source assertions. Check the vendor advisory and your installed configuration before determining exposure.
CVSS assessments
| Version / score | Vector | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1 / 8.2 high |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | CNA: Linux |
| 3.1 / 8.2 high |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | NVD: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 |
Exploit evidence
No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96ecddc5141c967c5a59fa85ccbdfdb3cec61209CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84c6089a365ff5547f9ea30cb407dc5fe3124fd3CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84c6089a365ff5547f9ea30cb407dc5fe3124fd3416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96ecddc5141c967c5a59fa85ccbdfdb3cec61209416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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