# CVE-2026-99563: smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener

Status: published. Published: 2026-11-19. Updated: 2026-11-22.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener

A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready
list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was
destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted
(negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...)
stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener
was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections
smbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with
-EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop
ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections.

Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the
end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was
started, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it
with smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener's
rdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy()
does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against
the backlog until they are released.

sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock
and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket:
smbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the
listener.

In order to make that work:

- a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via
  kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener
  under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently.

- smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending
  list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls
  smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the
  rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero
  return it schedules nsc's teardown with
  smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the
  listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its
  own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The
  teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc's
  id_priv->handler_mutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cm_id must
  not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex
  (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us,
  so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure
  orphan nsc.

- smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to
  the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the
  listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if
  sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a
  negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released.

- smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables
  purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets.

## Remediation

No remediation reported in collected sources

## Affected products and versions

- Linux / Linux: ≥ dc691b91ad1677def14582a279e56fd943b52f94; < c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb (affected, git); ≥ dc691b91ad1677def14582a279e56fd943b52f94; < df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f (affected, git); ≥ dc691b91ad1677def14582a279e56fd943b52f94; < 328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700 (affected, git). Source: CNA: Linux
- Linux / Linux: 7.1 (affected); ≥ 0; < 7.1 (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.2.15; ≤ 7.2.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.3.2; ≤ 7.3.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.4-rc1; ≤ * (unaffected, original_commit_for_fix). Source: CNA: Linux

## Severity and prioritization

- CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H; source: CNA: Linux

- CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H; source: NVD: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

- CISA KEV: No listing in collected sources

- EPSS: 0.15% as of 2026-11-21; percentile 4.64%

- SSVC: Not available

- Weaknesses: Not reported

## Exploit evidence

No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

## Provenance

- CNA: Linux: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99563; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99563; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- FIRST EPSS: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99563; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated Not reported

Revision: 9e9e9eaa725a107cdba01358ee098afc38995c8be67bcfdc839c222ffa2121e3

Canonical: https://y2.dev/cve/CVE-2026-99563

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