# CVE-2026-99485: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails

Status: published. Published: 2026-11-19. Updated: 2026-11-22.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails

aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:

	hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
	...
	ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
	if (ret)
		goto free_channel;
	...
free_channel:
	xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);

hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.

It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:

  - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
    channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
  - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
    aie2_destroy_context(),
  - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
    aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
    aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),

and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.

The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.

The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.

Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail.

## Remediation

No remediation reported in collected sources

## Affected products and versions

- Linux / Linux: ≥ d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548; < 35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473 (affected, git); ≥ d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548; < 2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4 (affected, git). Source: CNA: Linux
- Linux / Linux: 7.0 (affected); ≥ 0; < 7.0 (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.3.2; ≤ 7.3.* (unaffected, semver); ≥ 7.4-rc1; ≤ * (unaffected, original_commit_for_fix). Source: CNA: Linux

## Severity and prioritization

- CVSS 3.1: 7 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; source: CNA: Linux

- CVSS 3.1: 7 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; source: NVD: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

- CISA KEV: No listing in collected sources

- EPSS: 0.16% as of 2026-11-21; percentile 4.75%

- SSVC: Not available

- Weaknesses: Not reported

## Exploit evidence

No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4 (CNA: Linux)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)

## Provenance

- CNA: Linux: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99485; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99485; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated 2026-11-22

- FIRST EPSS: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99485; retrieved 2026-11-22; source updated Not reported

Revision: 8cd078fb45df3b68052bb1efd27d5a7fe33c97980e566b432ef481e932ca9c73

Canonical: https://y2.dev/cve/CVE-2026-99485

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