CVE-2026-92855

Fixes and workarounds

Workaround

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-06) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce proof of possession for bound keys in SAML identity broker subject-confirmation validation: upgrade to Keycloak 26.4.17 / 26.6.8 (or the corresponding fixed Red Hat builds), which enforce proof of possession for the bound key or reject assertions that contain only unvalidated holder-of-key confirmations, closing replaying intercepted SAML holder-of-key assertions. Until patched, this is a concern on Keycloak deployments configured as a SAML identity broker trusting upstream providers that issue holder-of-key assertions, so restrict and audit trusted upstream SAML identity providers issuing holder-of-key assertions to prevent interception and unauthorized replay of signed assertions. As a compensating measure, enforce mandatory secondary authentication factor in Keycloak post-federation to block login completion on replayed assertions. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying missing proof-of-possession verification flaw — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-801 Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) (medium)