{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","ecosystem":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","source":"CNA: zephyr","vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"cveId":"CVE-2026-87044","cwes":["CWE-401"],"description":"The Mbed TLS crypto shim driver in drivers/crypto/crypto_mbedtls_shim.c drives PSA multipart cipher and AEAD operations. In mbedtls_cbc() and mbedtls_aead(), every error path after a successful psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() / psa_aead_decrypt_setup() returned directly without calling psa_cipher_abort() / psa_aead_abort(). Because the abort is the only thing that reaches mbedtls_cipher_free(), each failed operation permanently leaked the heap-allocated mbedtls_aes_context (roughly 288 bytes) that setup had allocated from Mbed TLS's fixed static heap (_mbedtls_heap[CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HEAP_SIZE], default 512 bytes). With CONFIG_PSA_CRYPTO_PROVIDER_TFM the leaked object is instead a finite secure-partition multipart-operation slot.\n\nThe failure is chosen by an unauthenticated attacker. With CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_SECURITY backed by this driver, ieee802154_decrypt_auth() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_security.c invokes cipher_ccm_op() on every received secured frame, with no authentication ahead of the MIC check. A device in radio range can transmit a stream of syntactically valid 802.15.4 frames carrying a bogus MIC; each one makes psa_aead_verify() fail and leaks a block. The CBC path is reachable the same way through the OSDP secure channel, where CONFIG_OSDP_SC_ENABLED selects this shim and osdp_encrypt() / osdp_decrypt() leave out_buf_max unset, so every operation fails inside psa_cipher_update().\n\nExhausting the Mbed TLS heap — which the default configuration reaches after a couple of failed operations, and any realistic configuration reaches in well under a second of frames — makes all subsequent mbedtls_calloc() calls fail. Every later cryptographic operation in the image then fails permanently, including link-layer security and any TLS/DTLS sharing the same heap, until the device is rebooted. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure: frames with an invalid MIC are still rejected, so the impact is limited to availability.\n\nThe fix routes all post-setup failures in mbedtls_cbc() and mbedtls_aead() through a common error: label that calls the matching PSA abort before returning. Setup failures need no change, since the PSA core aborts the operation itself when setup fails.","epss":null,"exploits":[],"kev":null,"metrics":[{"score":6.5,"severity":"medium","source":"CNA: zephyr","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}],"modifiedAt":1793772549782,"publishedAt":1793772549782,"references":[{"source":"CNA: zephyr","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/8e7e9e9bf9f0b1a7acd12ef3d6d38473b1ce6d43"},{"source":"CNA: zephyr","tags":[],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-r8x3-637f-c986"}],"remediation":[{"kind":"fix","source":"CNA: zephyr","text":"The reporting source identifies this reference as a patch. Check the advisory for affected versions and supported release branches.","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/8e7e9e9bf9f0b1a7acd12ef3d6d38473b1ce6d43"}],"revision":"adcade888f3f22fadfed36c8a72d1e30dc538817012f9a968342c16cbdfb55c0","sources":[{"modifiedAt":1793772549782,"name":"CNA: zephyr","retrievedAt":1793776170478,"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-87044"}],"ssvc":null,"status":"published","title":"Memory leak in the Mbed TLS crypto shim on failed cipher/AEAD operations leads to remotely triggered crypto denial of service","updatedAt":1793776170478}