# CVE-2026-82976: Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret

Status: published. Published: 2026-11-03. Updated: 2026-11-03.

A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.

### Evidence
**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**
```go
func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
    f.mu.Lock()
    defer f.mu.Unlock()
    result := []fs.FileInfo{}
    for _, im := range f.images {
        result = append(result, im)
    }
    return result, nil
}

func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
    f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
    if name == "/" {
        return f, nil
    }
    ...
```

**cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**
```go
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))

go func() {
    server := &http.Server{
        Addr:              imagesBindAddr,   // default ":8084"
        ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
    }
    err := server.ListenAndServe()
```

**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image**
```go
func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
    source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
    return ignition_config_types_32.File{
        Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
        ...
```

### Attack Pattern
Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.

## Remediation

- workaround: There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected. (source: CNA: redhat)

## Affected products and versions

- Red Hat / Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 (openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel8): Version range not reported. Source: CNA: redhat
- Red Hat / Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 (openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel9): Version range not reported. Source: CNA: redhat
- Red Hat / Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 (openshift5/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel9): Version range not reported. Source: CNA: redhat

## Severity and prioritization

- CVSS 3.1: 7.1 (high); CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N; source: CNA: redhat

- CISA KEV: No listing in collected sources

- EPSS: Not available

- SSVC: Not available

- Weaknesses: CWE-548

## Exploit evidence

No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.

## References

- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976 (CNA: redhat; vdb-entry, x_refsource_REDHAT)

- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2526334 (CNA: redhat; issue-tracking, x_refsource_REDHAT)

- https://github.com/openshift/image-customization-controller (CNA: redhat)

- https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396 (CNA: redhat)

## Provenance

- CNA: redhat: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82976; retrieved 2026-11-03; source updated 2026-11-03

Revision: 2a6595edb5a12bc25d4106a898e800d3ace1a3c52883f97fb93407bee3e175c6

Canonical: https://y2.dev/cve/CVE-2026-82976

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