CVE-2026-43472
unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] > I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1). We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set, force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost of copy_fs_struct() is trivial. Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That seriously simplifies the analysis... FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/
Fixes and workarounds
No remediation reported in collected sources.
Missing remediation information is not evidence that no patch exists.
Affected products and versions
| Product | Versions | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < 845bf3c6963a52096d0d3866e4a92db77a0c03d8 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < d3ffc8f13034af895531a02c30b1fe3a34b46432 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < d0d99f60538ddb4a62ccaac2168d8f448965f083 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < d7963d6997fea86a6def242ac36198b86655f912 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < aa9ebc084505fb26dd90f4d7a249045aad152043 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < af8f4be3b68ac8caa41c8e5ead0eeaf5e85e42d0 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < 42e21e74061b0ebbd859839f81acf10efad02a27 (affected, git) ≥ 741a295130606143edbf9fc740f633dbc1e6225f; < 6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9f (affected, git) Other versions: unaffected |
CNA: Linux |
| Linux Linux |
2.6.16 (affected) ≥ 0; < 2.6.16 (unaffected, semver) ≥ 5.10.253; ≤ 5.10.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 5.15.203; ≤ 5.15.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 6.1.167; ≤ 6.1.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 6.6.130; ≤ 6.6.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 6.12.78; ≤ 6.12.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 6.18.19; ≤ 6.18.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 6.19.9; ≤ 6.19.* (unaffected, semver) ≥ 7.0; ≤ * (unaffected, original_commit_for_fix) Other versions: affected |
CNA: Linux |
Version ranges are source assertions. Check the vendor advisory and your installed configuration before determining exposure.
CVSS assessments
No CVSS assessment reported. An unscored record is not a low-severity determination.
Exploit evidence
No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/845bf3c6963a52096d0d3866e4a92db77a0c03d8CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ffc8f13034af895531a02c30b1fe3a34b46432CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0d99f60538ddb4a62ccaac2168d8f448965f083CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7963d6997fea86a6def242ac36198b86655f912CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa9ebc084505fb26dd90f4d7a249045aad152043CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af8f4be3b68ac8caa41c8e5ead0eeaf5e85e42d0CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42e21e74061b0ebbd859839f81acf10efad02a27CNA: Linux
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9fCNA: Linux
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