CVE-2026-31465
CVE-2026-31465
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: don't block sync for filesystems with no data integrity guarantees Add a SB_I_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY superblock flag for filesystems that cannot guarantee data persistence on sync (eg fuse). For superblocks with this flag set, sync kicks off writeback of dirty inodes but does not wait for the flusher threads to complete the writeback. This replaces the per-inode AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mapping flag added in commit f9a49aa302a0 ("fs/writeback: skip AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY mappings in wait_sb_inodes()"). The flag belongs at the superblock level because data integrity is a filesystem-wide property, not a per-inode one. Having this flag at the superblock level also allows us to skip having to iterate every dirty inode in wait_sb_inodes() only to skip each inode individually. Prior to this commit, mappings with no data integrity guarantees skipped waiting on writeback completion but still waited on the flusher threads to finish initiating the writeback. Waiting on the flusher threads is unnecessary. This commit kicks off writeback but does not wait on the flusher threads. This change properly addresses a recent report [1] for a suspend-to-RAM hang seen on fuse-overlayfs that was caused by waiting on the flusher threads to finish: Workqueue: pm_fs_sync pm_fs_sync_work_fn Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x457/0x1720 schedule+0x27/0xd0 wb_wait_for_completion+0x97/0xe0 sync_inodes_sb+0xf8/0x2e0 __iterate_supers+0xdc/0x160 ksys_sync+0x43/0xb0 pm_fs_sync_work_fn+0x17/0xa0 process_one_work+0x193/0x350 worker_thread+0x1a1/0x310 kthread+0xfc/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x243/0x280 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> On fuse this is problematic because there are paths that may cause the flusher thread to block (eg if systemd freezes the user session cgroups first, which freezes the fuse daemon, before invoking the kernel suspend. The kernel suspend triggers ->write_node() which on fuse issues a synchronous setattr request, which cannot be processed since the daemon is frozen. Or if the daemon is buggy and cannot properly complete writeback, initiating writeback on a dirty folio already under writeback leads to writeback_get_folio() -> folio_prepare_writeback() -> unconditional wait on writeback to finish, which will cause a hang). This commit restores fuse to its prior behavior before tmp folios were removed, where sync was essentially a no-op. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAJnrk1a-asuvfrbKXbEwwDSctvemF+6zfhdnuzO65Pt8HsFSRw@mail.gmail.com/T/#m632c4648e9cafc4239299887109ebd880ac6c5c1
Fixes and workarounds
Fix
The reporting source identifies this reference as a patch. Check the advisory for affected versions and supported release branches.
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67Fix
The reporting source identifies this reference as a patch. Check the advisory for affected versions and supported release branches.
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67Fix
The reporting source identifies this reference as a patch. Check the advisory for affected versions and supported release branches.
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67Affected products and versions
| Product | Versions | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| linux_kernel linux |
≥ 6.16; < 6.18.21 (affected, custom) | NVD |
| linux_kernel linux |
≥ 6.19; < 6.19.11 (affected, custom) | NVD |
| linux_kernel linux |
7.0 (affected, custom) | NVD |
Version ranges are source assertions. Check the vendor advisory and your installed configuration before determining exposure.
NVD applicability configurations (1)
These expressions retain AND/OR operators, negation, and required environmental products. A listed product is not sufficient to establish exposure when additional conditions apply.
[
{
"negate": false,
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.21",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "OR"
}
]CVSS assessments
| Version / score | Vector | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1 / 5.5 medium |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NVD: [email protected] |
Exploit evidence
No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c24a13d8a0466ca0446e58309e51f2606520164416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 · Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f9377cd2ab7a9220c25d33940d9ca20d368172416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 · Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83800f8ef358ea2fc9b1ae4986b83f2bc24be927416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 · Patch
For agents and automation
Read public disclosures for free as Markdown or JSON. Compatible browsers also expose native WebMCP tools to search disclosures, read this page, and discover API access.
Use the ontology-linked Cyber API with x402 pay per request, or a Y2 Pro or Elite API key with the intel:cyber scope.
Endpoints and access details
https://api.y2.dev/api/v2/cyber/cveshttps://api.y2.dev/api/v2/cyber/cves/{cveId}
A workspace owner or admin can create a Pro or Elite API key. Send Authorization: Bearer <Y2_API_KEY> from your trusted agent runtime.
For x402, omit Authorization and read the HTTP 402 payment challenge before signing a retry. Public browser tools do not make payments.