Public vulnerability disclosure

CVE-2026-17051

Out-of-bounds write in the Intel SEDI IPM driver from an unvalidated inbound doorbell length

publishedCWE-787

The Intel SEDI IPM (inter-processor mailbox) driver in drivers/ipm/ipm_sedi.c handles an inbound message interrupt in ipm_event_dispose(). It read the peer-written doorbell register, extracted the payload length with IPC_HEADER_GET_LENGTH(), and passed that length straight to sedi_ipc_read_msg() to copy the message into struct ipm_sedi_context.incoming_data_buf, without checking it against the buffer size. The doorbell length field is 10 bits wide (IPC_HEADER_LENGTH_MASK is 0x03FF), so it can encode up to 1023 bytes, while incoming_data_buf is IPC_DATA_LEN_MAX (128) bytes. The bounds check in the underlying HAL sedi_ipc_read_msg() is a DBG_CHECK that compiles away unless CONFIG_DEBUG is set, so no check remained in a production image. The doorbell register is written by the peer processor on the other side of the IPC link — for the intel_ish_5_* targets, the host CPU's ISH driver, reached through the device's memory-mapped register window. Host-side software with driver-level or raw BAR access can therefore set a length of up to 1023 and cause the interrupt handler to copy far past the destination buffer. The affected path requires an application to have registered an IPM receive callback via ipm_register_callback(), which is the driver's normal mode of use. The result is an out-of-bounds write of up to 895 bytes into static (.bss) memory, performed in interrupt context. The overflow first clobbers the rest of struct ipm_sedi_context — including the k_sem and k_mutex used by the transmit path, whose wait queues contain self-referential list pointers — and then adjacent static data, giving a kernel data-structure corruption and crash primitive. The overflowing bytes are read from registers following the message window, a portion of which are themselves peer-programmable. The fix rejects any doorbell whose encoded length exceeds IPC_DATA_LEN_MAX, logging it and acknowledging the doorbell so the peer is not left waiting.

Technical severity6.0 mediumCVSS 3.1 · CNA: zephyr
Published2026-09-21Source updated 2026-11-04
Collected2026-11-043 attributed sources

Fixes and workarounds

Fix

The reporting source identifies this reference as a patch. Check the advisory for affected versions and supported release branches.

Source: CNA: zephyr

Affected products and versions

Affected products, source version ranges and reporting authorities
ProductVersionsAuthority
zephyr
zephyrproject
zephyr
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr
≥ 3.5.0; < 4.3.2 (affected, semver)
≥ 4.4.0; < 4.4.2 (affected, semver)
Other versions: unaffected
CNA: zephyr

Version ranges are source assertions. Check the vendor advisory and your installed configuration before determining exposure.

CVSS assessments

CVSS scores, vectors and reporting authorities
Version / scoreVectorAuthority
3.1 / 6.0
medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HCNA: zephyr
3.1 / 6.0
medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HNVD: [email protected]

Exploit evidence

No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.

References

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