CVE-2026-119446
Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token
Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
Fixes and workarounds
Fix
Upgrading does not revoke tokens already handed out. A token from a CLI login is an ordinary API token with a note the client chose, so one an attacker obtained looks like any other. After upgrading, users should review their API tokens on the account page and delete any they do not recognise.
Source: CNA: EEFWorkaround
Block POST /api/auth/cli_session at the reverse proxy until the upgrade. It is the only entry point that creates a CLI login, so no link can be produced while it is blocked. CLIs can still sign in with an email and password (nh user auth, POST /api/users/auth), or use an API token created on the account page.
Source: CNA: EEFFix
The reporting source identifies this reference as a patch. Check the advisory for affected versions and supported release branches.
Source: CNA: EEFAffected products and versions
| Product | Versions | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| nerves_hub_web nerves-hub nerves-hub/nerves-hub
oci |
≥ 2.5.0; < 2.5.3 (affected, other)
Other versions: unaffected |
CNA: EEF |
| nerves_hub_web nerves-hub nerves_hub
otp |
≥ 2.5.0; < 2.5.3 (affected, semver)
Other versions: unaffected |
CNA: EEF |
| nerves_hub_web nerves-hub nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web
github |
≥ e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564; < 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508 (affected, git)
Other versions: unaffected |
CNA: EEF |
Version ranges are source assertions. Check the vendor advisory and your installed configuration before determining exposure.
CVSS assessments
| Version / score | Vector | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0 / 9.4 critical |
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H | CNA: EEF |
Exploit evidence
No exploit evidence in collected sources. This is not proof of no exploitation.
References
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-9vr9-463q-46qpCNA: EEF · vendor-advisory, related
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-119446.htmlCNA: EEF · related
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-119446CNA: EEF · related
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564CNA: EEF · related
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508CNA: EEF · patch
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