CVE-2026-105312

Fixes and workarounds

Workaround

1. Restrict Console CR RBAC — remove create/update/patch verbs on consoles.console.streamshub.github.com from tenant-level Roles. Only cluster administrators should manage Console CRs. 2. Deploy admission webhook — use OPA/Gatekeeper or Kyverno policy to validate spec.containers.api.spec.image against a trusted registry allowlist. 3. Apply network policies — restrict console-api pod egress to only required endpoints. 4. Single-tenant deployment — deploy the Console operator where only trusted administrators manage Console CRs. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to eliminate unvalidated container image deployment in the Console operator by enforcing image allowlists or removing tenant image override capabilities: upgrade to the fixed Console Operator builds, which requires image allowlist validation or removal of tenant image override capability to prevent deploying unvalidated images into pods bound to cluster-wide Strimzi CRD permissions, closing all 2 injection vectors (arbitrary container image injection via spec.containers.api.spec.image, ServiceAccount token exfiltration from privileged pod). Until patched, this is only a concern on Kubernetes clusters running Streams for Apache Kafka Console where tenants have RBAC permissions to create or update Console custom resources — single-tenant Kubernetes clusters where only cluster administrators manage Console custom resources are unaffected — so remove create, update, and patch permissions on Console custom resources from tenant-level RBAC roles and deploy admission webhooks to enforce container image allowlists. As a compensating measure, configure Kubernetes API server audit logging to detect Console custom resource changes and anomalous ServiceAccount operations, apply Kubernetes NetworkPolicies to block outbound pod traffic to the API server and external endpoints, restrict outbound egress to authorized endpoints to prevent ServiceAccount token exfiltration, separate tenant custom resource creation duties from privileged workload deployment, scope the console-server ServiceAccount to minimum required namespace permissions rather than cluster-wide access, and deploy Falco or eBPF runtime security to detect ServiceAccount token file access and unauthorized processes. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unvalidated container image specification — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-206 Network Policy (Kubernetes) (medium)